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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMi LAw REviEw
relationship of the parties.14 If the employer is allowed to exculpate himself
from all liability by designating his employees as independent contractors,
the court's decision is not in conformity with social policy.
CERALD N. CAPPS
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - CAR KEY STATUTES
The defendant automobile owner, in violation of a statute,' left his
car unattended with the key in the ignition. The car was stolen and the
thief, driving recklessly, injured the plaintiff. Held, the thief's driving at a
reckless rate of speed was an intervening cause which superseded the
original act of negligence of the defendant automobile owner.2 Permenter
v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 91 So.2d 243 (Miss. 1956).
Since the turn of the century the courts have been confronted with
the problem of imposing liability on an automobile owner to compensate
an injured third party when an unauthorized driver is at fault.3 In those
jurisdictions that have decided claims arising through violation of so called
"car key legislation,"' the majority have denied recovery as a matter of law
on the rationale that the violation of a penal statute is not intended to
result in civil liability;" some of these jurisdictions further conclude that
even assuming the violation of the statute0 is negligence per se, that the
negligence of the thief and not the violation is the proximate cause of
14. W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Crosley, 230 Ala. 403, 161 So. 536 (1935);
Scorpion v. American-Republican, 131 Conn. 42, 37 A.2d 802 (1944); Howe Fire
Apparatus Co. v. Humphrey, 113 Ind. App. 167, 46 N.E.2d 259 (1943); Goetschel
v. Glassell-Wilson Co., 13 La. App. 424, 127 So. 81 (1930); Dagley v. National Suit &
Cloak Co., 224 Mo. App. 61, 22 S.W.2d 892 (1929); Ottinger v. Morris, 187 Okla.
517, 104 P.2d 254 (1939).
1. MIss. CODE § 8219 (1942) provides: "No person driving or in charge of a
motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine,
locking the ignition and removing the key ..... Other "car key" statutes are: ALA. CODE
tit. 36 § 27 (Supp. 1953): AEK. STAT. ANN. § 75-651 (1947); COLO. Rev. STAT.
c. 13-4-76 (1953); TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE REGULATIONS FOR THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA § 5N; iDAIIO CODE ANN. § 49-560.1 (Supp. 1953); ILL. REv. STAT. c. 95 ,
§ 189 (1953); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2124 (1952); Ky. REv. STAT. § 189.430 (1953);
MD. ANN. CODE GEM. LAws art. 66 , § 212 (1951); N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 64-6-105
(1953); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-491 (1952); WYo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 60-530 (1945).
2. Three justices dissented.
3. Berman v. Schultz, 84 N.Y. Supp. 292 (1903); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y.
164, 126 N.E. 14 (1920); Schell v. DuBois, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N. E. 664 (1916).
4. See note I supra.
5. Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. App. 2d 58, 271 P.2d 23 (1954); Sullivan v.
Griffin, 318 Mass. 358, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945).
6. In the absence of statute the owner is not liable for the negligent operation
of the vehicle by a thief. Midkiff v. Watkins, 126 La. 449, 52 So.2d 573 (1951);
Saracco v. Lyttle, 11 N.J. Super. 254, 78 A.2d 288 (App. Div. 1951). Contra, Shaff v.
Claxton, 144F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
CASES NOTED
the injury.7 Such majority resolve the question of proximate causation
as a matter of law on the theory that the theft is not foreseeable.8
Conversely, a minority of courts have interpreted such statutes as imposing
a duty upon the general public and violation thereof as resulting in liability
as a matter of law.9 Still other minority jurisdictions have ruled that
the violation of such an enactment is only prima facie evidence of negli-
gence, and that the issue of proximate cause is a question of fact to be
left to the jury in the determination of the owner's liability.10
The instant case represents the reasoning of the majority." It concludes
that although the automobile owner may have been negligent in violating
the statute, it was solely the reckless driving of the thief that caused the
accident, the thief's recklessness superseding the original negligent act of
the owner. The dissenting justices point out that because reasonable men
may differ as to whether the owner should have reasonably anticipated the
act of a thief, the question should be left to the determination of the
jury.12 In support of this rationale the following considerations are relevant:
(1) the increasing frequency of car thefts;13 (2) the increased likelihood
of negligence when a thief is in command of the wheel;' 4 (3) the rise in
the number of cases involving the circumstances of the instant case.' 5
The insoluble riddle of whether violation of a "car key" statute, penal
in nature, is intended to result in civil liability can easily be remedied by
the legislature making a clear declaration of the intention and purpose of
such a statute. The need is apparent, as courts have reached diverse results
in fact situations similar to the instant case.'" In those jurisdictions where
there is no basis for civil liability under the statute, the better view is that
the violation of the statute gives rise to a possibility that a thief will take
the car and subsequently injure a third party."
7. Frank v. Ralston, 145 F. Supp. 294 (W. D. Ky. 1956); k :ste v. Red Cab Inc.,
122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952); Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81
N.E.2d (1948); Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d (1950)."
8. Ibid.
- 9. Ro'ss v. Hartman, 139 F.28 14 (D.C. 1943), cart. denied 321 U.S. 790 (1945).
10. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (* 54); Cstergard v.
Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N.E.2d 537 (1948). But see, Coc..:-,l, v. Sullivan, 344
I1I. App. 620, -101- N.E.2d 878 (1951).
11. See note 7 suo ra.
12. The dissenting opinion in Permenter v. Milner Chevrolct Co., 91 So.2d 243,
252 (Mss. 1956).
13. Comment, 38 MARQ. L. REV. 99 (1954).
14. Ibid.
15. A large majority of the cases have arisen within the last ten years. See cases
cited in notes 5-10 supra.
.. 16..Ross v.,Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cart. denied 321 U.S. 790
(1945); Frink'v'Ralston, 145 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Ky. 1956); Ney v. Yellow Cab Co.,
2 l1l.2d 74, 117 NE.2d 74 (1954).
17. See note 10 supira.
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The Restatement of Torts seems to present the most logical solution
to the problem of intervening cause.' In essence it states that if it is
foreseeable that a thief will steal the owner's automobile, the tortious
conduct of the thief will not necessarily absolve the owner of liability to
the injured third person. Thus, it is as anomalous to reason that the
intervening criminal or tortious conduct of a thief is a superseding force
absolving the owner of liability as it is to impose liability as a matter
of law. Obviously, there can be no infallible method in the solution to
this problem. The only logical alternative in the determination of the
owner's liability is to leave this question of causation to the jury.
ALVIN I. MALNIK
CORPORATIONS- PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL-
STOCKHOLDER LIABILITY
Appellant, who was the principal stockholder of a corporation, per-
mitted the use of her funds for the corporate business. She was joined
as a party defendant in supplementary proceedings in aid of execution
following judgment against the corporation for defrauding the creditors.
Held, that knowledge and participation in the fraud was imputed to the
appellant; the corporate veil was properly pierced; and the stockholder
was personally liable for the debts of the corporation. Codomo v. Emanuel,
91 So.2d 653 (FLA. 1956).
The general rule which has been almost universally accepted states
that a corporation is a legal entity separate and apart from its stockholders,
and will be recognized as such,1 unless this recognition would tend to
18. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 449 (1934). If the realizable likelihood that a third
person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards
which make the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent,
intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor from being
liable for the harm caused thereby.
I. U.S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (E.D. Wis. 1905);
First Nat. Bank of Cadson v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 24 So. 351 (1898); Mosher
v. Lee, 32 Ariz. 560, 261 Pac. 35 (1927); Midwest Air Filters Pac. v. Finn, 201 Cal.
587, 258 Pac. 382 (1897); Martin v. D.B. Martin Co., 10 Del. Ch. 211, 88 Atl. 612
(1913); South Florida Citrus Land Co. v. Waldin, 61 Fla. 766, 55 So. 862 (1911);
Biscayne Realty and Ins. Co. v. Ostend Realty Co., 109 Fla. 1, 148 So. 560 (1933);
Donovan v. Purtell, 216 Ill. 629, 75 N.E. 334 (1905); Congdon v. Congdon, 160
Minn. 343, 200 N.W. 76 (1924); Ehlers v. Bankers Fire Ins. Co., 108 Neb. 756,
189 N.W. 159 (1922); State Trust & Savings Bank v. Hermosa Land and Cattle Co.,
30 N.M. 566, 240 Pac. 469 (1925); People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y.
582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890); Damascas Mfg. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 119 Ohio 439,
164 N.E. 530 (1928); Security Savings & Trust Co. v. Portland Flour Mills Co., 124
Ore. 276, 261 Pac. 432 (1927); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Service Laundry Co., 160 Tenn.
57, 22 S.W.2d 6 (1929); Boston & Texas Corp. v. Guarantee Life Ins. Co., 233 S.W.
1022 (Tex Civ. App. 1921).
